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INTRODUCTION

In the twenty-first century, the use of drones in military
combat operations is one of the most legally controversial issues
confronting international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of
armed conflict (LOAC).1 This article argues that drones should be
treated as any other component of the United States’ (U.S.)2 arsenal.
A drone can be considered to be a weapons platform or singular
weapon system. This article further argues that drones indeed offer
extensive and enhanced opportunities for compliance with LOAC
and other relevant laws governing the use of certain weapons.
Particularly, drones are well suited to execute theories of self-defense
in international affairs. In fact, drones can be used for a wide variety
of tasks other than kinetic operations, such as: observation and
reconnaissance, intelligence collection, target acquisition, search and
rescue, delivery of humanitarian aid, and transportation of
equipment.3 The appearance of new and advanced weapons in
warfare is hardly a new challenge in the history of armed conflict. 4
The epic poem Mahabharatha, [200 B.C.-200 A.D.] forbids the use of
‘hyper-destructive’ weapons: the warrior Arjuna, observing the law of
war, refrained from using the pasupathastra5 because when the fight
was restricted to ordinary conventional weapons, the use of

Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT'L.
L. J. 294 (2011-12).
2 Hereinafter, United States referred to as U.S.
3 David Turns, Droning on: some international humanitarian law aspects of the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary armed conflicts, CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
TO THE LAWS OF WAR, 199 (2014).
4 Rayan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 103 (2010-2011).
5 See
generally, Section XL, http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/m03/
m03040.htm, Pasupathastra: capable of destroying all beings and creation itself, this
weapon should not be hurled without adequate cause; for if hurled at any foe of
little might it may destroy the whole universe. In the three worlds with all their
mobile and immobile creatures, there is none who is incapable of being slain by this
weapon. And it may be hurled by the mind, by the eye, by words, and by the bow.
1
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extraordinary or unconventional weapons was not even moral, let
alone in conformity with religion or recognized rules of warfare.6
At different times in history, developments such as the
crossbow, gunpowder, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, noxious
gasses, nuclear bombs, and a number of other deadly inventions
irreversibly changed the landscape of warfare and required
combatants to reassess the laws governing armed conflict. 7 Drones
have become a central instrument in armed conflict, and an
increasing number of states and even non-state actors have deployed
them in some way or another – although Western armies clearly have
a significant technological advantage in this respect. 8 Legal scholars
have expressed a variety of opinions on the use of drones.9 On one
hand, scholars argue that drones are lawful weapons under
international law in a time of armed conflict, while on the other hand,
critics argue that drones are being used in ways that violate
international law.10 The legality of drones has been questioned for a
variety of reasons, some more grounded in fact than others, but
despite this criticism there is little question that the use of drones in
surveillance and combat roles is on the rise.11
The recent proliferation of drones has spawned intellectual
debate on whether a country has the right under the LOAC and
international law to unilaterally deploy these remotely controlled
aircrafts abroad for military purposes. The use of drones in support
of combat operations – particularly striking distant terror operatives –
has become the most controversial legal topic. 12 Many of the mostfrequently expressed criticisms about drones and drone warfare do
not hold up well under serious scrutiny or, at any rate, there’s nothing
6 GRAY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 7 (2010).
7 Vogel, supra note 4 at 103.
8 Ferderic Megret, The Humanitarian Problem with Drones, 5 UT. L. REV. 1284
(2013).
9 Shani
Dann, Drone Strikes and IHL, (Nov. 6, 2014)
http://humanityinwarblog.com/2014/11/06/drone-strikes-and-ihl/.
10 Id.
11 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.
12 Heeyong Daniel Jang, The Lawfulness of and Case for Combat Drones in the
Fight Against Terrorism, 2:1 NAT'L L.J. 2 (2013-2014).
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uniquely different or worse about drones when compared to other
military technologies.13 Consider the most common anti-drone
argument: drones kill a disproportionate number of civilian noncombatants.14 However, drones kill fewer civilians, as a percentage of
total fatalities, than any other military weapon. 15 According to the
U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)16 2012 report, the number
of Afghan civilian casualties caused by the United States and its allies
did not increase in 2012, in fact, they decreased by 46 percent. More
specifically, civilian casualties from 'aerial attacks' fell 42 percent. 17
The UNAMA report found that drones released 506 weapons in
2012, compared to 294 from the previous year.18 Five incidents
resulted in casualties with sixteen civilians killed and three wounded,
up from just one incident in 2011.19 Even as drone attacks increased,
the U.N. reported an overall decrease in civilian deaths by airstrikes
with the U.S.-led coalition implementing stricter measures to prevent
innocent people from being killed.20 In another empirical report
concerning drone strikes cited by The New York Times, 522 strikes
have killed an estimated 3,376 militants and 476 civilians, decimating
al-Qaida leadership even as the loss of innocent life intensifies antiAmerican sentiment in nations where strikes occur.21 Further,
according to The Long War Journal, an estimated 801 militant deaths in
Rosa Brooks, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted
Killing: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Human Rights, 113TH CONG., 2 (April 23, 2013) (Statement by Professor Rosa
Brooks, Geo. U. L. Center), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewconte
nt.cgi?article=1114&context=cong
14 Id.
15 William
Saletan, In Defense of Drones, SLATE, (Feb. 2013)
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/02/dron
es.
16 Hereinafter, U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan referred to as “UNAMA” or
“UNAMA’s”.
17 Saletan, supra note 15.
18 Kim Gamel, UN: Drones killed more Afghan civilians in 2012, YAHOO NEWS,
(Feb. 19, 2013) https://www.yahoo.com/news/un-drones-killed-more-afghancivilians-2012-145931602.html?ref=gs.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Steven Simon, In Defense of Drones, MSNBC (Apr. 26, 2015),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/defense-drones.
13
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Pakistan occurred from U.S. drone strikes in 2010.22 This figure is
significantly higher than the 195 drone-caused deaths occurring from
2004 to 2007.'23
In contrast, several claims of civilian casualties caused by
conventional aircrafts and weaponry have gone underreported. For
example, an interview conducted by The Economist with twenty
residents of the Pakistani tribal areas confirmed that many residents
view individual drone strikes as preferable to the artillery barrages of
the Pakistani military.24 The residents insisted that the drones do not
kill as many civilians—a view starkly at odds with mainstream
Pakistani opinion.25 An elder from North Waziristan stated, “No one
dares to tell the real picture. Drone attacks are killing the militants
who are killing innocent people.”26 Jet planes, artillery attacks, and
bombings are the problem, not drones. Critics often assert that U.S.
drone strikes are morally wrong because they kill innocent civilians. 27
This is undoubtedly both true and tragic, but nonetheless, it does not
validate the arguments against drone strikes.28 War kills innocent
civilians, period.29 But the best evidence currently available suggests
that U.S. drone strikes kill fewer civilians than most other common
means of warfare.30 The operational effectiveness of drones is
undisputed. Martha McSally, former fighter pilot and drone squadron
commander for the U.S. Air Force, stated in her April 23, 2013
testimony to the Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, “once a decision has
been made that it is a legal and wise strategy to conduct a target
strike, the [drone] platform is usually the hands-down best choice to
maximize precision, persistent intelligence, responsiveness, and
Jang, supra note 12.
Id.
24 Kenneth Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, Three Deep Flaws in Two New
Human-Rights Reports on U.S. Drone Strikes, NEW REPUBLIC, (Oct. 24, 2013)
https://newrepublic.com/article/115329/amnesty-international-human-rightswatch-drone-reports-are-flawed
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Brooks, supra note 13.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
22
23
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oversight by commanders, intelligence and legal experts. It also has
the benefit of minimizing civilian casualties without risk of U.S.
casualties and at relatively low cost.”31 Additionally, drone pilots
located in air-conditioned trailers on secure bases are far less likely to
err than fighter pilots, who have to deal with numerous other factors
while on missions.32 According to one international legal expert:
There is little reason to treat drones as distinct from
other weapons systems with regard to the legal
consequences of their employment. Nor is there a
sound basis for heightened concern as to their use.
On the contrary, the use of drones may actually, in
certain cases, enhance the protections to which
various persons and objects are entitled under
LOAC.33
The use of drones must therefore be carefully weighed
against the fact that it creates enemies, even as it destroys them.
Under that logic, the same argument might as well be used against all
airstrikes, or for that matter, artillery strikes.34 Both of these
alternatives tend to be more indiscriminate in their effects than
drones.35
This article argues that drones should be treated as any other
component of the U.S. arsenal. A drone can be considered a weapons
platform or a single weapon system. In addition, this article argues
that drones indeed offer extensive and enhanced opportunities for
compliance with LOAC and laws governing the use of certain
weapons. Particularly, drones are well-suited to execute theories of
self-defense in international affairs.

Martha McSally, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG, (last updated Apr. 29, 2015)
http://drones.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001894.
32 Simon, supra note 21.
33 MICHAEL S CHMITT, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 313 (2010).
34 Simon, supra note 21.
35 Id.
31
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The first part of the article provided a general overview of
drones and their modern day implications. The second section will
discuss the definition of drones and the technological capabilities of
an armed drone. The third section will discuss the legality per se of
drones as a weapon system in association with general principles of
LOAC (i.e. military necessity, humanity, distinction and
proportionality). In addition, the third portion will also explore the
application of just war theory and its two components, jus as bellum
and jus in bello. In the fourth section, this article demonstrates how
effective drones can be in executing self-defense operations,
illustrated by a case study of the U.S. drone strategy during the War
on Terror. Generally, this article examines the legality of drone strikes
under LOAC based upon the geographical location of a given target.
Finally, the article will conclude by exploring military command
responsibility for the violations of LOAC during drone operations
and the legal status of the drone operator.
II.

DRONES

The term “drone” is consistently and materially employed
throughout this article, as such, there is a need to stipulate to a
working definition because of the term’s importance here.
A. What Exactly is a Drone?
To ensure the same basic understanding of the term from the
outset, this preliminary definition should help readers in addressing
the legal issues that underlie the use of drones. Categorically, "drone"
refers to any unmanned, remotely-piloted, flying craft ranging from
something as small as a radio-controlled toy helicopter, to the 32,000pound, $104 million Global Hawk military drone.36 In determining
what exactly constitutes a drone under this language one considers
whether the vehicle or flying craft at issue (1) flies and (2) is
Kelsey D. Atherton, Flying Robots 101: Everything You Need to Know About
Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/
2013-03/drone-any-other-name.
36
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controlled by a pilot on the ground; if the vehicle meets this criteria it
falls under the everyday-language definition of drone.37 The U.S.
Army officially defines a drone as “a land, sea, or air vehicle that is
remotely or automatically controlled.”38 Military drones are also
referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), or hunter-killers.39 The history of
drones is that of a watchful eye turned weapon. 40 The drone is not a
projectile, but a projectile-carrying machine.41
B. Technology Used in Armed Drones & their Capabilities
Before learning about the legal aspects governing drones, it is
important to discuss the relevant technology used in armed drones
for a better understanding of their legality. The key difference
between human soldiers on the ground and a drone hovering above
is that humans have to distinguish and make targeting decisions
instantly. In contrast, drones give commanders “tactical patience” the ability to see, think, and act in a controlled manner. Drones are
controlled by a crew often miles away from the dangers of combat,
and are capable of acting as both a combatant and a combat support
vehicle in the hairiest of battles.42 Drones combine several
complimentary technologies on a single platform. 43 For example, a
single drone can contain highly advanced surveillance systems, livefeed video cameras, infrared cameras, thermal sensors and radar, and
various types of other equipment including global positioning
systems (GPS), and precision munitions.44 The high-tech cameras on
Id.
Department of defense, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS
109 (Aug. 2011). (Original Gregoire Chamayou, Translated by Janet Lloyd, A
THEORY OF THE DRONE 27 (2015).
39 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.
40 GREGOIRE CHAMAYOU, A THEORY OF THE DRONE 11 (2015).
41 Id.
42 Robert Valdes, How the Predator UAV Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, (Apr.
1, 2004) http://science.howstuffworks.com/predator.htm.
43 James Igoe Walsh, The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and
Counter terrorism Campaigns, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE AND U.S. ARMY WAR
COLLEGE PRESS, V (Sep. 2013).
44 Surveillance
Drones,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones.
37
38
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drones can scan entire cities, or alternatively, zoom in and read a milk
carton from 60,000 feet.45 Surveillance data gathered by a drone can
be relayed to satellites that then send it down to ground forces to
help form attack strategies and identify enemy vulnerabilities. 46
Armed drones carry highly accurate missiles that have the capacity to
target individuals, automobiles, and sections of structures such as
rooms in a large house.47 These missiles can be guided by the
intelligence obtained by the sensors discussed above or through realtime, on-ground intelligence.48 Drones’ low profile and relative fuel
efficiency combine to permit them to spend more time on target than
any other manned aircraft.49 Some military drones can stay airborne
for hours or days at a time.50 Drones also carry Wi-Fi crackers and
can act as fake cell phone towers to determine a target’s location or
intercept texts and phone calls.51 Given the ongoing convergence of
drones and emerging technologies, it may even become possible for
drones to perform facial recognition, identify behavior patterns, and
monitor individuals’ conversations.52
A typical drone is made of light composite materials to
reduce weight and increase maneuverability.53 Drones can fly at
extremely high altitudes to avoid detection54 and their navigational
systems can be programmed to operate autonomously, from takeoff
to landing.55 Drones have distinct advantages over manned aircraft
vehicles, cruise missiles, and Special Operations attacks.56 The use of
drones actually permits for far greater precision in targeting than
Id.
V. Shalem Pravas, Aerial Assassins: Drones, Read & Digest, (accessed Sept.
1, 2015), http://readanddigest.com/what-is-a-drone/.
47 Id.
48 Walsh, supra note 43.
49 Robert Valdes, supra note 42.
50 Surveillance Drones, supra note 44.
51 Id.
52 Chris Cole & Jim Wright, What are drones?, DRONE WARS U.K. (Jan. 20,
2010) wars.net/aboutdrone/" http://dronew
ars.net/aboutdrone/.
53 Pravas, supra note 46.
54 Id.
55 KENNETH R. HIMES O.F.M., DRONES AND THE ETHICS OF TARGETED
KILLING 12 (2016).
56 Id.
45
46
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most other traditional manned aircrafts.57 Further, drones can handle
what humans cannot: G-Force speed, tedium, and boredom. 58
Among the other “intrinsic benefits” of drones: they deprive the
enemy of human targets; they don’t get tired, thirsty, or hungry; and
are relatively inexpensive.59 In a worst-case scenario, if a drone is lost
in battle military personal can simply "crack another one out of the
box" and have it up in the air shortly without the trauma of casualties
or the fear of pilots becoming prisoners; both of which being
common concerns when more-traditional aircraft or operation
failures occur.60 Without a doubt, drones are of great benefit to the
counterterrorism effort.61
III.

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

All warfare is governed by IHL, also known as the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC).62
A. What is the Law of Armed Conflict?
The LOAC comes from both customary international law
and treaties.63 Customary international law, based on a practice that
nations have come to accept as legally required, establishes the
traditional rules that govern the conduct of military operations in
armed conflict. 64 The Law of Armed Conflict “arises from a desire
among civilized nations to prevent unnecessary suffering and

Brooks, supra note 13.
Alan W. Dowd, Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings, U.S. ARMY WAR
COLLEGE (2013), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/
Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Valdes, supra note 42.
61 Himes, supra note 55.
62 James Foy, Autonomous Weapons Systems Taking the Human Out of
International Humanitarian Law, 23 DAL. J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 53 (2014).
63 Rod Powers, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), THE RULES OF WAR,
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm
64 Id.
57
58
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destruction while not impeding the effective waging of war.” 65
Indeed, modern LOAC is largely driven by humanitarian concerns. 66
As a part of public international law the LOAC regulates the conduct
of armed hostilities, but only among consenting nations.67 It also aims
to protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked.68 The LOAC regulates, among other things, the means
and methods of warfare – the weapons used and the tactics
employed.69 At its foundation, the LOAC is based on four key
principles: distinction, proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and
military necessity. All of which undergird the spirit and purpose of
the law and drive determinations in areas such as targeting, detention,
and treatment of persons.70 The legality of drones can also be
justified under the principles of weapon laws and targeting laws. The
four fundamental LOAC principles are discussed in detail in the
following section.
When determining the overall lawfulness of a weapon system
under LOAC, there are two distinct aspects of the law that need to
be analyzed: weapons law and lawful use of drones. 71 The former
verifies that the weapon itself is lawful. 72 Weapon laws determine
whether the use of the weapon system during hostilities might be
prohibited in some manner under the law of armed conflict.73 A
weapon must satisfy two legal aspects before it may lawfully be used
on a battlefield;74 the weapon should (1) prevent unnecessary
suffering, and (2) be capable of effectively distinguishing targets. The
overarching principle that pertains to weapon systems is the
Id.
Solis, supra note 6, at 7.
67 Powers, supra note 63.
68 Id.
69 Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to to Use Drones?,
7 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2015).
70 Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone strikes impact the law of war?,
U. Pa. J. Int’l L. vol. 33:3, 681 (Feb. 14, 2012).
71 Jeffrey Thurnher, The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 4, (January 18, 2013), https://www.asil.org
/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
65
66
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prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 75 Weapons
that cannot be directed at specific military objectives, or weaponry
considered overly dangerous by nature, can violate the principle of
76
distinction and found to be unlawful per se. Moreover, even if a
specific type of weapon is not unlawful per se, or is not specifically
prohibited by particular treaties, governments are prohibited from
improperly employing a weapon in a manner that would result in
unnecessary suffering or in the targeting of civilian populations. 77
Such use is also unlawful under the relevant rules of the LOAC.78
The two rules governing weapon laws are discussed in detail in the
following section.
1. General Principles of the LOAC.
In this section, the principles of the LOAC will be applied to
the use of drones in combat and combat support operations. This
analysis falls squarely within LOAC principles. Again, the LOAC
revolves around four core principles: distinction, proportionality,
preventing unnecessary suffering, and military necessity. Application
of any weapon depends upon these four general principles of the
LOAC. Additionally, targeting law governs the circumstances of the
use of lawful weapons and includes general principles of the LOAC.
The following arguments help establish a basis for the conclusion
that LOAC rules are sufficient to regulate drones.
(i) Distinction
“Distinction” means persons
distinguish between lawful military
combatants, equipment, or facilities),
civilians, medical personnel, chaplains, or

75
76
77
78

Gross, supra note 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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combat), property, and unlawful targets.79 Greater awareness of the
distinction principle has coincided with technological developments
that enable increasingly precise targeting. 80 According to Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention,
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants, and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.81
Through its language, Additional Protocol I prohibits the use
of weapons that are “of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”82
Far from bombing entire industrial valleys or cities, which
would inevitably lead to civilians being caught in the crosshairs, new
technology has allowed states to be far more discriminate.83 Indeed,
the adoption of drones equipped with precision-guided munitions is
the most recent improvement.84 Drones equipped with modern
imaging technologies enable operators located thousands of miles
away to view details as fine as individual faces; this allows operators
to distinguish between civilians and combatants far more effectively
than most other weapons systems.85 According to General (Ret.)
James E. Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, "advances in high band-width satellite communications, sensing
79 Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for Developing
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 189 (2010).
80 JOHN KAAG & SARAH KREPS, DRONE WARFARE 81 (2010).
81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), ICRC (8 June 1977)
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/8a9e7e14c63c7f30
c12563cd0051dc5c?OpenDocument,.
82 Rule 71, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v1_rul_rule71.
83 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 81.
84 Id.
85 Brooks, supra note 13.
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technologies – particularly full motion video – combined with
existing aircraft technology has allowed armed drones to emerge as
the platform of choice in this counter terror mission space.”86 On
April 30, 2012, CIA Director John Brennan, said, “with the
unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely target a
military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could
argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows U.S. to
distinguish more effectively between an al-Qaida terrorist and
innocent civilians…[.]”87 Therefore, because drones can effectively
distinguish between targets, it can be concluded that drones meet the
standard of distinction under the LOAC.
(ii) Proportionality
The LOAC principle of proportionality requires that the
expected loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property
incidental to attack not be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated from striking the target.88 Article
35 of Additional Protocol I declares that “in any armed conflict, the
right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of
warfare is not unlimited[;]” this basic principle was officially codified
by the 1907 Hague Convention, however, studies suggest that similar
albeit informal principles were commonly observed by combatants
prior to the Hague Convention. 89 The principle focus of
proportionality seeks to minimize incidental casualties during war and
operationalizes the LOAC’s fundamental premise that the means and
methods of attacking the enemy are not unlimited.90 The key here is
the word “incidental,” meaning outside of the military target. 91
Importantly, however, the law does not prohibit all civilian deaths—
John Brennan, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG (Apr. 29, 2015), http://drones.procon.org/view.a
nswers.php?questionID=001894.
87 Id.
88 Basic Principles of LOAC and their Targeting Implications, CURTIS E. LEMAY
CENTER, https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-60-D33-Target-LOAC
.pdf (last updated Jan. 10, 2014).
89 Blank, supra note 70, at 681-82.
90 Id.
91 Id.
86
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and in fact accepts some incidental civilian casualties.92 Armed drones
offer the advantage of less destructive weapons and greater command
and control over firing decisions. Drones can employ Hellfire
missiles that weigh one-hundred pounds with a warhead of
approximately thirty five pounds.93 That is one-twentieth the size of a
standard laser-guided bomb or cruise missile and less than half the
size of the smallest precision ordnance dropped from conventional
aircraft.94 Proportionality inherently covers the notion to control and
limit collateral damage to civilians and civilian property. This is a
venerable concept. Grotius writes, “one must take care of, so far as is
possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by
accident.”95 Even when a target is purely militant, the element of
proportionality is still considered when prosecuting a target.
Proportionality brings with it an obligation to consider all options
when making targeting decisions: verification of the target; timing of
the attack; the chosen weapon of choice; and warnings and
evacuations for civilian populations.96 Drones, with their ability to
see, think, and act in a controlled manner, provide ample opportunity
to consider all options before engaging a target. Drone operators,
after duly considering all options and taking all mitigating maneuvers
into account, are able to minimize damage to civilian life and
property.
(iii) Unnecessary suffering
The principle of humanity, also commonly referred to as the
principle of unnecessary suffering, aims to minimize suffering in
armed conflict.97 The core LOAC concept of unnecessary suffering, a
concept created to limit damage to civilians while killing combatants,
is codified in Additional Protocol 1, Article 35(2) “it is prohibited to
employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of
Id.
Michael W. Lewis and Emily Crawrord, Drones and Distinction: How IHL
Encouraged the Rise of Drones, 44 Geo. J. INT'L L. 1151(2013).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 275.
96 Id.
97 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
92
93
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a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” 98 Once
a military purpose has been achieved, the infliction of further
suffering is unnecessary.99 A weapon is not banned on the ground of
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering merely because it causes
great, or even horrendous suffering or injury. 100 There is nothing
unique about the armaments and munitions carried by drones and
used by their pilots. Thus, Alston, who served as the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
acknowledged in his Study on Targeted Killings that, "a missile fired
from a drone is no different from any other commonly used weapon,
including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires
missiles."101
Compliance with the principle of unnecessary suffering
depends upon the kind of weapon used and the kind of suffering that
it might cause. Weapons can be specifically chosen to satisfy this
principle; however, compliance with the LOAC depends upon the
features of the weapon used and the competency of those employing
the weapon to carry out a particular mission. Also, it is difficult to
determine what constitutes “unnecessary suffering” because there is
no globally accepted standard.
(iv) Military Necessity
Finally, “military necessity” means that combatants may only
employ force against legitimate military objectives.102 The principle of
military necessity recognizes that a military has the right to use any
measures not forbidden by the laws of war that are indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as
possible.103 Military necessity requires combat-forces to only engage
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 80.
99 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
100 Solis, supra note 6, at 270.
101 Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary
executions), Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28,
2010).
102 Toscano, supra note 79.
103 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
98
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in acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective. 104 It
further permits the killing of enemy combatants and other persons
whose death is unavoidable.105 The principle of military necessity is a
principle of controlled violence. 106 Military necessity permits the
destruction of property if that destruction is imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war.107 Destruction of civilian property as an end
in-itself is a violation of international law.108 There must be a
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the
overcoming of enemy forces.109 International humanitarian law also
prohibits weapon systems that cannot be directed at a specific
military target.110 Over the past few years several U.S. Government
officials have confirmed that drones are an invaluable tool against AlQaeda, the Islamic State, Taliban, and associated terrorist forces.111 In
some areas, drones are particularly useful because of their ability to
find and identify targeted persons, and then reach into territory that
ground forces cannot enter due to either military or political
reasons.112 In one reported case, the United States targeted a senior
Taliban official in the impenetrable border region of Pakistan while
he was resting on the roof of a house with his wife and hooked up to
an IV-drip for kidney problems.113 The Taliban member was wanted
for his involvement in a number of suicide bombings and the
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.114
ANTHONY FINN & STEVE SCHEDING, DEVELOPMENTS AND
CHALLENGES FOR AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED VEHICLES: A COMPENDIUM 172
(2010).
105 Id.
106 Gross, supra note 69, at 28.
107 Finn & Scheding, supra note 104.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY J., 10 (2013),
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-AutonomousWeapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf.
111 Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL’Y, 115 (2010-2011).
112 Id.
113 Id; See also, Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta, A More Aggressive
CIA, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/20/AR2010032 003343.html.
114 Id.
104
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In such situations, and others like it, drone strikes offer a "definite
military advantage."115 Drones, because of advanced technology can
be very precise in targeted killing. Commanders and their legal
advisors have ample to make informed decision to go after a target.
They can easily assess the situation, and are capable of controlling the
violence.
B. Drones as Lawful Weapons
This section is intended to determine whether current
weapon laws of LOAC are capable of regulating drones. In modern
times, LOAC governs the choice of weapons and prohibits or
restricts the use of certain weapons. Rule 71 of Customary IHL,
which applies to both international and domestic conflicts,
establishes the norm that the use of weapons which are
indiscriminate by nature is prohibited; this norm of customary
international law is applicable in both international and noninternational armed conflicts.116 In addition, many of the basic rules
and specific prohibitions and restrictions on means and methods of
warfare may be found in customary intentional law.117 These
restrictions can be traced back to treaties and customary international
law, and are justified on the grounds that weapons which are either:
(i) indiscriminate in their effect, or (ii) cause unnecessary suffering
should be prohibited. 118
The Declaration of Saint Petersburg is the first formal
agreement prohibiting the use of certain weapons in war. “The
Declaration to that effect adopted in 1868, which has the force of
Id.
Rule 71 (Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate), Customary
International
Humanitarian
Law,
ICRC,
(accessed
7
July
2015)
https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rul 71,
117 Kathleen Lawand, A Guide to Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and
Methods of Warfare, Measure to implement article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 (2006),
ICRC,
Revised,
Geneva,
(accessed
22
July
2015)
http://www.article36.org/wpontent/uploads/2011/12/icrc_002_0902.pdf.
118 A.G. Houston, Executive Series ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict,
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Ed. 1, 4.4, (2006) http://www.defence.gov.au/
adfwc/documents/doctrinelibrary/addp/addp06.4-lawofarmedconflict.pdf.
115
116
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law, confirms the customary rule according to which the use of arms,
projectiles and materials of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering is
prohibited.”119 Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 serves as a
further reference found in international treaties for the need to carry
out legal reviews of new weapons, means, and methods of warfare.
The Protocol provides that:
[I]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption
of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a
High Contracting Party (describes a party to any
international agreement which has both signed and
ratified the treaty) is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or all
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by
any other rule of international law applicable to the
High Contracting Party (HCP).120
“Means of warfare” are weapons and weapon systems,
whereas “method of warfare” refers to the tactics, techniques and
procedures by which hostilities are conducted.121 Also, international
law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed conflict:
indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause unnecessary
suffering.122 The first prohibition appears in Article 51(4) of
Additional Protocol I, which defines indiscriminate attacks as: (1)
attacks “not directed at a specific military objective;” (2) attacks
“which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a military objective;” or (3) attacks “which employ a
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by this Protocol.”123 It is prohibited to “use weapons that are
119 Treaties and State parties to such Treaties, DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE
USE, IN TIME OF WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 GRAMMES
WEIGHT. SAINT PETERSBURG, 29 NOVEMBER / 11 DECEMBER 1868, ICRC
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument.
120 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,
TREATIES, ST., PARTIES & COMMENT. (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross), at Article
35, available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750044?OpenDocument.
121 Schmit, supra note 110, at 27.
122 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
123 Id.
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incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”124
Examples of inherently indiscriminate weapons are the rockets that
Hamas and Hezbollah have fired into Israel for many years, cluster
munitions, and nuclear weapons that destroy all life within the area of
the detonation. 125 Additionally, weapons that cause unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury are prohibited.126 Expanding bullets
and blinding lasers offer two examples.127 Peter Maurer, the president
of the International Committee of Red Cross has stated:
[U]nder international humanitarian law the rules of
war, i.e. the set of laws governing armed conflict,
drones are not expressly prohibited, nor are they
considered to be inherently indiscriminate or
perfidious. In this respect, they are no different from
weapons launched from manned aircraft such as
helicopters or other combat aircraft. It is important to
emphasize, however, that while drones are not
unlawful in themselves, their use is subject to
international law.128
Therefore, it appears drones comply with the various weapon
laws, however, when a drone is acting as a “weapons platform,” the
ordinance carried by the drone is still governed by other specific areas
of weapons law. For example, if a drone is armed with chemical
weapons, the applicable law is the convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical
Weapons and their Destruction.129 Alternatively, if armed with
‘conventional’ munitions, then the general law of targeting would
apply (be that treaty law, customary international law, or both). 130
See, Id.
Id.
126 Id., at 685.
127 Id., at 686.
128 Peter Maurer (the president of the ICRC), The use of armed drones must
comply with laws, ICRC, (May 10, 2013) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources
/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm.
129 M.N. SCHMITT, LOUISE ARIMATSU, & TIM MCCORMACK, YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 137 (Aug. 5, 2011), (Ian Henderson, chapter:
Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the use of Armed Drones).
130 Id.
124
125
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Usually, drones carry Hellfire missiles, which are not banned by any
international treaty or convention and do not have any characteristics
that cause unnecessary injury. By both measures of weapon laws —
indiscriminate targeting and preventing unnecessary suffering—
armed drones pass muster.131
As discussed above, a drone can have advanced technical
features and extensive surveillance capabilities, and when combined
with precision-guided Hellfire missile, drones should be considered a
discriminate weapon system. The ability to track a target for hours,
even days, before launching an attack facilitates accurate targeting and
enhances the protection of civilians by allowing drone operators the
ability to choose the time and place of attack with an intent of
minimizing civilian casualties or damage.132 Therefore, because armed
drones can easily target pure military objectives, and have effects that
can be limited, as much as possible, to military objects, drones thus
meet the standards of Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I.133
C. Lawful Use of Drones Under the LOAC
Drones, like any weapon, can be used for unlawful purposes,
especially outside a combat zone. However, because drones are
lawful weapons, the next step is to analyze their use according to the
principles of the LOAC; or more particularly, the principles of
distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
1. Distinction.
As discussed above, advanced technology places drones in a
better position to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. Historically, distinction was fairly easy; combatants wore
uniforms and non-combatants did not. Now, the ‘global war on
terrorism’ has raised new concerns because terrorists do not wear
traditional uniforms, and it has become harder to distinguish between
131
132
133

Blank, supra note 70, at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
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civilians and terrorists. Terrorists often take advantage of civilian
populations and hide themselves among them. The situation has
raised new challenges for drone operators in regards to distinction.
State militaries wishing to assert compliance with a legal regime that
regards human shielding and intermingling with the civilian
population as unacceptable were pressured to ensure that their
attacks became increasingly more discriminate and that their
intelligence became more accurate.134 The challenge found in nonstate armed conflict is identifying the legitimate target. As discussed
above, Article 48 of Additional Protocol I states that:
in order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.135
Distinction is also emphasized in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol
I:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate
attacks are:
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific
military objective;
(b) Those which employ a method or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective; or
(c) Those which employ a method or means of
combat the effects of which cannot be limited
as required by this Protocol; and
consequently, in each such case, are of a
Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1153.
Additional Protocol I, available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473
c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/8a9e7e14c63c7f30c12563cd00.
134
135
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nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.136
Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all
violations of distinction constitute “grave breaches”(foot note
explaining or one brief sentence) of the Protocol, and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court similarly criminalizes
attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks.137 However, states
have historically virtually ignored the principle of distinction by
employing artillery, rocket launchers, and bombers in assaults on
irregular forces occupying densely populated areas, resulting in tens
of thousands of civilian casualties.138 However, in order to minimize
collateral damage and comply with the principle of distinction states
began to employ more precise weapons than those designed to defeat
a more traditional military opponent. 139 This is where drones enter
the picture.140
The United States has consistently asserted that it complies
with the LOAC in its battle against Al-Qaeda.141 Examining how the
U.S. responds to Al-Qaedas’ practice of hiding amongst the civilian
populations of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen serves as a
good illustration of how a state military may seek to comply with the
LOAC's distinction requirements.142 Persons who are members of an
organized armed group, but dress the same as civilians, either for a
lack of uniforms or specifically to blend into the civilian population
for protection, are legitimate targets at all times.143 The United State’s
need for more robust intelligence greatly increased the demand for
drones, which were first employed in the conflict with Al-Qaeda as
real-time intelligence gathering vehicles for distinction purposes.144
Article 51, Additional Protocol I,
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750065.
137 Blank, supra note 70, at 691.
138 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1152.
139 Id. at 1153.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Blank, supra note 70, at 692.
144 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1153.
136
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Drones are a better option as compared to boots on ground. Drone
strikes give militaries more time to analyze the situation; operators
and decision makers can use the ‘pattern of life’ method to pursue a
target (analysis, using evidence collected by surveillance cameras on
the unmanned aircraft and from other sources regarding individuals
and locations).145 Further, ground forces face the challenge of
distinguishing between civilians and terrorists more promptly than
drones, with less situational awareness. Drones may also reduce the
emotional element for the humans behind the “joy sticks” when
engaging targets.146
2. Proportionality.
Proportionality is closely linked with the principle of
distinction and correctly identifying objects as military and civilian.147
For an action to be considered proportional, the anticipated military
gain must exceed the anticipated damage to civilians and their
property. 148 Article 51(b) of Additional Protocol I proscribes that “an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated” is disproportionate.149 Thus, a
commander must refrain from any attack in which the expected
civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the anticipated military
advantage gained.150 Loss of life and damage to property incidental to
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected to be gained. 151 The key here is the word
145 Emptywheel, Pattern of Life drone strikes, SHADOW PROOF, (May 7, 2010)
https://shadowproof.com/2010/05/06/pattern-of-life-drone-strikes.
146 P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, 25, 4041 (Winter 2009), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20090203
_TNA23Singer.pdf/.
147 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 94.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
151 Four
basic principles, LOAC (accessed March 21, 2017)
http://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/; See generally
U.S. Army Field Manual FM27-10: Law of Land Warfare.
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“incidental,” meaning outside of the military targets or more
commonly known as “collateral damage.”152 However, if a target is
purely military (i.e. no civilian component) proportionality is not a
requirement.153 Proportionality is a necessary consideration in attacks
on civilians, not on combatants.154 Proportionality brings with it an
obligation to consider all options when making targeting decisions:
verifying the target, timing the target, identifying the weapons used,
warning and evacuating civilian populations. 155 Grotius writes, “one
must take care of, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of
innocent persons, even by accident.”156 According to CIA Director
John Brennan:
Compared against other options, a pilot operating this
aircraft remotely, with the benefit of technology and
with the safety of distance, might actually have a
clearer picture of the target and its surroundings,
including the presence of innocent civilians. It’s this
surgical precision, the ability, with laser-like focus, to
eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida
terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it,
that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential.157
3. Taking Precautions.
The principle of precaution is important because it provides
constant consideration and implementation of precautionary
measures that reinforces moral clarity for the warfighter thrust into
terribly complex tactical and operational environments.158 The
principle of precaution can be further understood by reviewing
Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention:
Id.
Id.
154 Solis, supra note 6, at 274.
155 Blank, supra note 70, at 275.
156 Id.
157 Brennan, supra note 86.
158 Geoffrey Corn, Precautions to minimize civilian harm are a fundamental principle
of the law of war, JUST SECURITY, (July 8, 2015) https://www.justsecurity.org
/24493/obligation-precautions-fundamental-principle-law-war/.
152
153
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In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps
should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices
devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals,
and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not used at the same time for
military purposes. The besieged should indicate these
buildings or places by some particular and visible
signs, which should previously be notified to the
assailants.159
Also, Article 2(3) of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) further
states, “[a] commander shall take all due measures in order that the
town may suffer as little harm as possible.”160 Article 57(2)(c) of
Additional Protocol I mandates that those who plan or decide upon
an attack "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects."161 Additionally, according to article 57 (3)
of Additional Protocol I, “when a choice is possible between several
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the
objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.”162 The primary variables of Article 57 may be identified as
“the time necessary to gather and process the additional information,
the extent to which it would clarify any uncertainty, competing
demands on the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance system in
question, and risk to it and its operators’.163 Finally, according to
article 58 of Additional Protocol I, the Parties to the conflict shall, to
the maximum extent feasible:
159 Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/19th_century/hague02.as#art27.
160 Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/20thcentury/hague09.asp.
161 Article 57 (2) (ii) of AP I, available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih
l.nsf/9ac284404d38ed2bc1256311002afd89/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c.
162 Article 57 (3) of AP I, available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih
l.nsf/9ac284404d38ed2bc1256311002afd89/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c.
163 Frederik Rosén, Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close: Drones, Control and
Legal Responsibility, J CONFLICT SECURITY L. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://jcsl.oxford
journals.org/content/early/2013/10/16/jcsl.krt02.
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(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth
Convention, endeavor to remove the civilian
population, individual civilians and civilian
objects under their control from the vicinity of
military objectives;
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas;
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect
the civilian population, individual civilians and
civilian objects under their control against the
dangers resulting from military operations. This
principle of avoidance (also known as "taking
precautions") means that it is not enough not to
intend to kill civilians while attacking legitimate
targets.164
Indeed, a deliberate, affirmative effort has to be made not to
harm civilians.165 This may mean, for example, that certain targets
ought to be attacked only during certain hours (e.g., at night, when
no civilians may be around),’ that some attacks may need to be
conducted from a certain angle, and that advance warnings to the
civilian population must be issued by the attacker prior to the
strike.166 In this regard, drone technology removes a number of
classic dilemmas related to precaution. Drones leave plenty of time
for the consideration and execution of precautionary steps.167 Drones
allow commanders to incorporate precautionary measures in strategy
formulation, executing signature strikes, and targeted killings. 168
Hours, days, or weeks of surveillance may lie ahead of a drone
attack.169 It has been argued that there is “strong evidence that drones
are better, not worse, at noncombatant discrimination.” 170 The
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Gross, supra note 69, at 30.
Id.
Id.
Rosén, supra note 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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factors mentioned above do not eliminate the risk of civilian
casualties, but they certainly represent feasible precautions that can
minimize incidental loss of civilian life.171 Conversely, drones may not
be used when other means or methods of warfare that would result
in less collateral damage with an equivalent prospect of mission
success are available.”172
The rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon
system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the
use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict-such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs—so long as they
are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. 173 In all three
areas of distinction, proportionality, and precautions—drones’ unique
and advanced capabilities suggest great potential for adherence to
LOAC obligations.174 Drones are not automatons; they depend on
human operators, analysts, and decision makers to comply with the
laws of war.
D. Just War Theory
The Just War Theory formalizes the moral justifications for
war. It is a lens fixed in the Western philosophical tradition. 176
From the start, Just War theorists have focused on two central
175

Stuart Casey-Maslen, Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and
international human rights law, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, NO. 886 AT 601
(Summer 2012), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-886casey-maslen.pdf.
172 Blank, supra note 70, at 686
173 Galloway Family Foundation, Lawful Use of Drones by Non-State Actors:
Who can Kill, (Jan. 8, 2014) http://www.gallowayfoundation.org/lawful-use-ofdrones-by-non-state-actors-who-can-kill/.
174 Blank, supra note 70, at 701.
175 Ethan A. Wright, Of Drones and Justice: A Just War Theory Analysis of the
Unite States’ Drone Campaigns, URSINUS COLLEGE, at 12 (2015)
http://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&
context=ethics_essay.
176 Id.
171
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questions: (1) when is it appropriate to go to war (jus ad bellum), and
(2) how should the war be fought (jus in bello).177
1. Jus Ad Bellum.
Jus ad bellum means the legality of the use of force by a
territorial state. Jus ad bellum governs the legality of recourse to
military force (including drone strikes) by one state against another,
and against armed non-state actors.178 As a threshold matter, the jus
ad bellum inquiry depends on whether the territorial state has
consented to the drone strike.179 However, recent history has
demonstrated that consent of a state is not necessarily required when
conducting drone operations.180 Article 2(4) is properly interpreted as
prohibiting all uses of force above a certain minimal level.181 Minimal
uses of force such as firing a single shot across an international
boundary might violate the principle of non-intervention, but is
probably too minor to come within the purview of Article 2(4).182
The threshold for the occurrence of an armed attack by another state
thus appears to be relatively high, going beyond a mere frontier
incident between members of the armed forces of two states (or
armed groups operating in one state with limited support from
another state).183 It might even be argued by some that a very limited
and targeted drone strike by one state, against individuals located in
another state, would not constitute an armed attack under the UN
Charter or customary law.184 This argument is based on the highly
contested concept of anticipatory self-defense (self-defense will be
177 Erich Freiberger, Just War Theory and the Ethics of Drone Warfare, E-INT’L
REL., (July 18, 2013), http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/18/just-war-theory-and-theethics-of-drone-warfare/.
178 Maslen, supra note 171, at 601.
179 Laurence Shore et al., The Legality Under International Law of Targeted
Killings by Drones Launched by the United States, COMMITTEE ON INT’L L., N.Y. CITY B.
ASS’N, at 8 (June 8, 2014)
180 Maslen, supra note 171, at 601.
181 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A CASE STUDY
OF PAKISTAN, at 13 (2004-2009).
182 Id.
183 Maslen, supra note 171, at 602.
184 Id.

193

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/28/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

discussed separately in a later section). 185 If there is consent, there is
no infringement on sovereignty. 186 Although a definitive answer to
this factual question is impossible without access to confidential
material, the publicly available information suggests that states187 have
given their consent to U.S. drone strikes.188 Because some state have
publicly withheld their consent, the U.S. must consider whether
alternative justifications provide a legal basis for continued U.S.
drone strikes under Just War theory.189
(i) Jus in Bello
Jus in bello analysis provides a legal basis for states in
determining who is an acceptable target, and who is not. The typical
distinction is between “combatants,” who may be the targets of
wartime operations, and “non-combatants,” who are exempt from
being targets of such attacks.190 In essence, jus in bello is the
foundation for the principles of distinction, proportionality, and
necessity discussed above. Most legal scholars agree that drone strikes
are legal under jus in bello as long as they occur during armed
conflict. 191 Nothing is inherently illegal about using drones to kill
during warfare, just as other airplanes are not forbidden.192 Drones by
themselves are not really weapons, and the armaments they do carry
are generally lawful.193

Id.
Shore et al., supra note 179, at 8-9.
187 With the apparent exception of Pakistan.
188 Shore et al., supra note 179, at 9.
189 Id.
190 Freiberger, supra note 177.
191 JAMES DESHAW RAE, JOHN CRIST, & PALGRAVE MACMILLAN,
ANALYZING THE DRONE DEBATES: TARGETED KILLINGS, REMOTE WARFARE,
AND
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 62 (Mar. 12, 2014), available at
https://books.google.com/books?id=eFkJAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&d
q=Drones+as+Lawful+Weapons&source=bl&ots=mW3rmZwFPG&sig=I5mkvpBXyHmv3I0_Niv_jd1lU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDwQ6AEwBGoVChMIuIHuqZHayAIVi6SICh26wwK
-#v=onepage&q=Drones%20as%20Lawfu.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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SELF-DEFENSE THEORY

This section demonstrates the effectiveness of drones in
executing self-defense operations, illustrated by a case study of the
U.S. drone strategy during the War on Terror. U.S. national security
strategy has encompassed the pre-emptive self-defense doctrine since
the domestic attack that took place on September 11, 2001;
commonly referred to as “9/11.” This doctrine argues that it is legal
for a state to launch a pre-emptive attack when it reasonably believes
that another entity is planning an attack on the state.194 However, the
U.S. has long recognized the importance of defending its interests,
both domestically and abroad. In 1854, a U.S. diplomat was attacked
in the town of San Juan del Norte (Greytown) 195, Nicaragua.196 At the
time of the attack, Greytown had been forcibly seized by forces that
were politically unrecognized by the U.S., and engaged in other acts
of violence against U.S. nationals.197 The U.S. Secretary of the Navy
ordered the bombardment of the town after the enemy force’s refusal
to adhere to the U.S.’s demand for redress.198 The presidential
authorization of the military force used in Greytown was later
challenged in U.S. courts, with each ruling being appealed until the
case arrived at the Supreme Court.199 Justice Nelson of the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in the opinion that the President had the
power to order the responsive use of armed force as part of a power
of “protection” of U.S. nationals abroad against “acts of lawless
violence” and “an irresponsible and marauding community.”200 At the

194 Kate McCann & Christopher Hope, Are UK drone strikes in Syria legal?
THE TELEGRAPH, (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/middleeast/syria/11852228/Are-UK-drone-strikes- in-Syria-legal.html.
195 Hereinafter San Juan del Norte is referred as Greytown.
196 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of
U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19.2 J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POL’Y, at 245 (also
see, Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186). Due to lack
of recognition of the putative government, the community can be classified as a
non-state actor).
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 245.
200 Id.
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time of the ruling, the U.S. did not consider the ongoing conflict with
Nicaragua, Greytown, or its unrecognized government as “war”.201
The customary law of a state’s right to self-defense is
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.202 Article 51 states:
[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Article 51 of the Charter expressly affirms the right of a state
to respond defensively “if an armed attack occurs.”203 “Armed
attack” is the operative phrase of the text; a state may use force
against both state and non-state aggressors under a theory of selfdefense. And further, nothing in the language of Article 51 or any
otherwise relevant customary international law requires consent of
the state from which a non-state actor attack is emanating, and on
whose territory a self-defense action takes place against the non-state
actor.204 Article 51 provides that nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.205 The United States has justified its

201
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Paust, supra note 196, at 241.
Id. at 249.
Schmitt, supra note 33, at 5.
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drone operations occurring outside the context of an armed conflict
with another state on the basis of this right.206
In fact, with respect to permissible measures of self-defense
under Article 51, a form of consent from each member of the United
Nations already exists in advance by treaty. 207 For example, with
respect to the U.S. use of drones in Pakistan to target Al-Qaeda and
Taliban forces, it is clear that the U.S. would not need the express
consent of Pakistan to carry out self-defense targeting.208 It is also
clear that the U.S. has the right to use drones in Pakistan under
Article 51 of the Charter in self-defense to protect U.S. interests from
continuous Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks launched from Pakistan. 209
There is a growing body of law that generally recognizes the actions
taken by the U.S. as legal according to international standards.
According to public reports, U.S. officials have regularly consulted
with Pakistani authorities when drones have been employed for strike
operations in Pakistan.210 However, Pakistan maintains only limited
control over large swaths of its territory, and thus, as a result,
terrorists have used that ungoverned space to their advantage; in
response, President Trump and former-President Barack Obama
have made clear that the United States will act if and when Pakistan
cannot.211
V.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF DRONE STRIKES AND LOAC

Under the LOAC, in military operations, the location of a
strike matters. The LOAC cannot apply places where armed conflict
does not exist, and the determination of whether armed conflict does
in-fact exist is based upon the intensity of the violence occurring in
that given place, in addition to the level of organization employed by
the forces involved, as laid out in the Tadic opinion.212 The
206
207
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Paust, supra note 196, at 239.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Vogel, supra note 111, at 131.
Id.
Lewis, supra note 1, at 301.
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appearance of drones in the arsenal of armed conflict has stimulated
renewed attempts to define the parameters of the modern
battlefield.213 The location in which military operations are actually
taking place at any given time is known as the ‘area of operations,’
“the theatre of war,” or simply, the ‘battlefield.’ 214 Conventional
LOAC contains references to “zones of military operations,” the
‘zone of combat,’ and ‘battlefield areas’ although these terms remain
ambiguous.215 The ever-increasing use of drones in the pursuit of the
“war on terror” has raised concerns over the emergence of a global
battlefield whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of
the LOAC.216
For the past several years, the geographical location of drone
attacks has expanded at a rapid rate; Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
Somalia, and Libya have all been subject to drone strikes under the
blanket justification of fighting terrorism. 217 Some of these strikes,
such as those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya, fall within the
generally recognized parameters of an armed conflict. Others, such as
those in Yemen and Somalia, raise more complicated questions
regarding where force is being used and what that means in terms of
the application of the LOAC.218 These concerns primarily stem from
frequent drone strikes occurring outside the ‘active battlefields’ of
Afghanistan and into the bordering regions of Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia.219
Drone strikes blur the geographical boundaries of the
battlefield. In traditional conflicts, military operations were confined
to the territories of the actors and were not supposed to spillover to
neutral states.220 The law of neutrality generally “defines the
relationship under international law between states engaged in an

Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the
Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 8 (2013).
214 Id. at 9.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See Blank, supra note 70, at 708.
218 Id.
219 Lubell & Derejko, supra note 213, at 11.
220 Blank, supra note 70, at 711.
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armed conflict and those that are not participating in that conflict.” 221
Neutrality law thus led to a geographic-based framework in which
belligerents can fight on belligerent territory or the commons, but
must refrain from any operations on neutral territory. 222 In essence,
the battle space in a traditional armed conflict between two or more
states is anywhere outside the sovereign territory of any of the neutral
states.223 However, because the U.S. drone program largely targets
non-state actors that freely move across borders, laws of neutrality
have become less effective.
The U.S. government operates two drone programs. 224 The
military’s version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the
recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of
the U.S. military stationed there. As such, the program is an extension
of conventional warfare.225 The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror
suspects around the world, including countries where U.S. troops are
not based.226 The program is classified as covert, and the intelligence
agency declines to provide any information to the public about where
it operates, how it selects a target, who is in charge, or how many
casualties the program has led to. 227 It is contended that drone strikes
in places like Yemen and Pakistan violate international law because
there is no currently recognized conflict between these states and the
US.228
However, just a few weeks after the attacks of 9/11,
President George W. Bush laid the foundation for the notion of the
whole world as a battlefield when he pronounced, “our war on terror
will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the
past. This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or
plan.”229 The Obama Administration has not specifically adopted that
Id.
Id.
223 Id.
224 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A Case Study of
Pakistan, NOTRE DAME L. SCH. LEGAL STUDIES RES. PAPER NO. 09-43, 4 (2010).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.
229 Blank, supra note 70, at 712.
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same language calling for a global battlefield, but has actually
significantly expanded the use of drone strikes outside of
Afghanistan.230 Al-Qaeda maintains a strong presence in a number of
countries, most notably Yemen and Somalia, and uses such states to
recruit, train, and plan attacks against the United States and its allies.
The United States has repo1rtedly conducted limited drone
operations in such countries.231 Somalia and Yemen present an even
more compelling case (than say Pakistan) of a neutral status; both
states are considered “failed states” and are unable to consent or
object to U.S. actions and the U.S. has not formally acknowledged
the use of force in these states.232
However, according to Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the days following 9/11:
the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.233
If consent was given by a state and U.S. personnel engaged a
target authorized by the AUMF, the strike would arguably be covered
under AUMF authority and fall within the LOAC. 234 Therefore, the
U.S. is not territorially limited when conducting operations against
non-state participants.235 Moreover, there is no question that
Pakistan's territory falls within the greater AUMF theater of conflict.
U.S. officials have argued that the fight with AUMF enemies is
Id.
Vogel, supra note 111, at 132.
232 Id.
233 107th
Congress, PUBLIC LAW 107–40
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf.
234 Vogel, supra note 111, at 132.
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global, not confined to the territory of one country. 236 In fact, most
of the leadership and many of the fighters intended to be covered by
the AUMF are located outside of Afghanistan and within Pakistan's
borders.237
Thus, location matters, but it is not overly prohibitive. 238 The
U.S. has consistently made the case that the war with Al-Qaeda and
its terrorist associates is of global reach. 239 The epicenter is in
Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Iraq), but Al-Qaeda and its
offshoots, as transnational non-state actors, operate in and wage war
from states across the world.240
VI.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DURING DRONE OPERATIONS

Under the LOAC and international criminal law, military
personnel are criminally responsible for any war crimes they commit
during war.241 In the case of drones, the most controversial aspect of
a drone program is the legal status of the operator. 242 Military
commanders often consult their staff judge advocates (SJAs),
especially in the escalation of conflict. 243 Seeking legal advice is
increasing and has become prevalent, even in the battle space.244 “It is
also clear from the commanders . . . that legal advice is essential to
effective combat operations in the current environment—legal advice
is now part of the tooth not the tail.”245

Id.
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238 Vogel, supra note 111, at 132.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Nathalie Weizmann, Autonomous Weapon System under International Law,
ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 8, at 3 (Nov. 2014).
242 Vogel, supra note 111, at 134.
243 Edward Major, Law and Ethics in Command Decision Making, U. OF PENN.,
61 (June 2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl
/conferences/cyberwar/papers/reading/Major.pdf.
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Even those who support nearly every other aspect of drone
warfare find themselves uneasy with civilian personnel performing
combat functions.246 According to Peter Maurer, the president of the
ICRC:
Although the operators of remote-controlled
weapons systems such as drones may be far from the
battlefield, they still run the weapon system, identify
the target and fire the missiles. They generally operate
under responsible command; therefore, under
international humanitarian law, drone operators and
their chain of command are accountable for what
happens. The fact of their being thousands of
kilometers away from the battlefield does not absolve
drone operators and their chain of command of their
responsibilities, which include upholding the
principles of distinction and proportionality, and
taking all necessary precautions in attack. Drone
operators are thus no different than the pilots of
manned aircraft such as helicopters or other combat
aircraft as far as their obligation to comply with
international humanitarian law is concerned, and they
are no different as far as being targetable under the
rules of international humanitarian law.247
Military drone operators live and work in the US, leading
relatively normal civilian lives outside of their occupation. 248 Unlike
deployed personnel who remain in a combat environment
continuously, drone operators maintain more stereotypical
employment; they come in to work each day, gather intelligence,
execute strikes when required, and return home for dinner. 249 All the
while, military drone operators and their chain of command are
subject to the laws of war.
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However, command responsibility is not as clearly defined
when drone operations are conducted by the CIA. The CIA follows,
or at least professes to follow, the laws of armed conflict. 250 As
discussed above, the CIA operates one of the two drone programs
for the U.S. The CIA program is not considered a military program,
is not operated as one, and is not governed “by the same
international protocols on the conduct of war” as the Department of
Defense.251 The clandestine and largely unaccountable nature of the
CIA program creates the most ambiguities for Just War theorists. 252
According to Philip Alston U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary, or arbitrary executions:
Intelligence personnel do not have immunity from
prosecution under domestic law for their conduct.
They are thus unlike State armed forces which would
generally be immune from prosecution for the same
conduct.... Thus, CIA personnel could be prosecuted
for murder under the domestic law of any country in
which they conduct targeted drone killings, and could
also be prosecuted for violations of applicable U.S.
law.253
Alston is not alone in this assessment of CIA drone pilots’
status. As noted by Rayan Vogel, a Foreign Affairs Specialist, and
member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S.
Department of Defense:
The CIA is a civilian agency and not a branch of the
U.S. Armed Forces. Even under a liberal reading of
Article 4 from GC III, the CIA would not meet the
requirements of lawful belligerency as a militia or
volunteer corps because, while they do report to a
responsible chain of command (albeit not always a
military chain of command), as a group they do not
wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves,
250
251
252
253

Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1158.
Wright, supra note 175, at 7.
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nor do they carry their arms openly. CIA personnel
are therefore unprivileged belligerents in this
conflict. 254
Gary Solis agrees with this assessment and has opined at
some length on the status of CIA drone operators as unprivileged
belligerents:
Those CIA agents are, unlike their military
counterparts but like the fighters they target, unlawful
combatants. No less than their insurgent targets, they
are fighters without uniforms or insignia, directly
participating in hostilities, employing armed force
contrary to the laws and customs of war. Even if they
are sitting in Langley, the CIA pilots are civilians
violating the requirement of distinction, a core
concept of armed conflict, as they directly participate
in hostilities...it makes no difference that CIA civilians
are employed by, or in the service of, the U.S.
government or its armed forces. They are civilians;
they wear no distinguishing uniform or sign, and if
they input target data or pilot armed drones in the
combat zone, they directly participate in hostilities-which means they may be lawfully targeted ....
Moreover, CIA civilian personnel who repeatedly and
directly participate in hostilities may have what recent
guidance from the International Committee of the
Red Cross terms "a continuous combat function."
That status, the ICRC guidance says, makes them
legitimate targets whenever and wherever they may be
found, including Langley. 255
When the laws of armed conflict were developed, there was
no technology such as drones used in the battlefield. Perhaps, new
laws should be developed, especially to protect and guide drone
operators. Drones are different than traditional forces that must react
promptly to various hostile situations and make decisions within their
254
255
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own judgment. In the case of drones, it is conceivable that the
President may become involved with the assistance of military and
legal advisors before authorizing a drone operator to engage a target.
Therefore, the laws delineating command responsibility in both
drone programs need to be updated and promulgated to ensure
operations conform with the LOAC.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated that current laws are capable of
governing drone warfare. The fundamental principles of the law of
armed conflict, specialized weapons treaties, The Hague and Geneva
conventions, customary law, and the UN Charter all provide a
thorough legal backdrop to govern the usage of drones.256 As with all
weapons, it is essential to ensure that drone attacks are launched only
against legitimate military objectives in accordance with the laws
governing the use of force.257 The sole legal issue specific to drone
operations under both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello is weapon
choice.258 As correctly noted by Special Reporter Alston, “a missile
fired from a drone is no different from any other commonly used
weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship
that fires missiles. The critical legal question is the same for each
weapon: whether its specific use complies with LOAC.”259 Drones
provide a legally permissible use of force to support self-defense.260
Drone attacks can occur against state or non-state actors located in a
foreign country from which the armed attacks emanate even though
there is no special consent of the foreign state, no imputation of the
non-state actor’s attacks to the foreign state, no armed conflict
between the foreign state and the United States, and the foreign state

Vogel, supra note 111, at 137.
Blank, supra note 70, at 716-17.
258 Michael Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello:
Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’, at 13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801179.
259 Id.
260 Jordan Paust, Operationalizing use of drones against non-state terrorists under the
international law of self-defense, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV., 203 (2013), (last accessed in
2015).
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is willing or unable to stop the attacks.261 However, the legal status of
drone operators remains as a challenging legal question while the
field continues to develop.
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